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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
JESSIE SCOTT,

Case No.
12155

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a jury verdict rendered in the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, presiding,
finding appellant guilty of robbery in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-51-1 (1953).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted by jury and sentenced to
an indeterminate term as provided by law.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the decision of the district
court should be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent stipulates to the sequence of events as
rendered by appellant's brief but seeks to clarify those
facts as they actually appear in the record .

.

To prove guilt in a factual situation such as this, the
evidence must be viewed by its cumulative effect rather
than on a segmented basis.
Mr. Rosenberg swore that he positively identified
Scott as the suspect who robbed his store on the night
in question, having viewed that person for an indeterminable length of time under full view and adequate lighting
within a distance of less than six feet (T. 18-21). Granted
he may have been a little nervous, but he also had adequate opportunity to identify Scott and when the police
showed him twelve to fourteen photos of "negro" suspects
he readily identified Jessie Scott as the robber (R. 64).
Rosenberg further testified that the suspect had had
some difficulty using his right arm when he pulled the
gun from his pocket (R. 69). Mr. Nemelka on crossexamination of the defendant brought out the fact that
Scott had "cut" quite badly his right arm a short time
prior to the alleged events which would probably
have impaired his use of it (R. 122). Although Scott is
left-handed, the fact that his arm was injured would also
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substantiate the identity of the accused by other than
facial characteristics.
Miss Frkovich testified that Jessie Scott had been
at the convalescent hospital at the alleged time of the
robbery. Ordinarily, Miss Sorenson's testimony that she
talked to Scott in the vicinity of the store would not be
too important for an implication of guilt. However, when
defendant's alibi was placed in issue, Miss Sorenson's
personal identification of Scott became critically important to that question of guilt.
Scott had a clearly distinguishable "limp" from which
one would easily notice such if defendant were walking
(R. 74). Miss Sorenson stated that she followed Scott
for a considerable distance at which time she noticed him
to be limping (R. 55) . She also testified that for four or
five minutes she observed Scott under a porch light (R.
64) without a hat (R. 58), and not only was the artificial
light from the porch adequate to distinguish Scott's features but also the lights from the milk depot across the
street aided her identification of the accused. This evidence in and of itself was more than adequate to destroy
Scott's alibi, especially when we consider the testimonies
solicited from the hospital workers who at no time during
the period the robbery was to have taken place personally saw Scott in his room at the hospital. In fact, one
of the attendants stated that they had had a good deal
of trouble with patients leaving the hospital to roam the
streets (R. 108). Indeed, even without Miss Sorenson's
testimony that refuted Scott's alibi, said alibi would
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still be highly tenuous when the evidence upon which it
was based is reviewed. Miss Sorenson's testimony further
associated Scott with the milk depot robbery when she
testified that Scott had asked her if "the gas pumps were
busy now." The only gas pumps in the neighborhood
were those at the milk depot (R. 56).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE RECEIVED AT TRIAL
C LE AR L Y SUBSTANTIATED SCOTT'S
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
AND THE JURY'S VERDICT OUGHT TO
BE LEFT UNTOUCHED BASED UPON APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH
PREJUDICIAL ERROR OR F 0 R THAT
MA'I'TER ANY ERRORS WHATSOEVER IN
THE TRIAL PROCEDURES OR EVIDENCE.
Appellant Scott attacks the sufficiency of the state's
evidence based solely upon the theoretically undependable nature of "eyewitness" testimony. By his argument
Scott would place an undue burden of proof upon the
State by imposing criteria that would require the fact
gathering processes of the state to be made absolute and
exact sciences. Yet the very nature of criminal conduct
itself makes this theory nonsensical and totally impossible to implement. If admissible evidence were left strictly
to real tangible evidence, the ingenuity of the criminal
mind would undoubtedly make way for the proverbial
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"perfect crime," wherein criminal detection and apprehension would be rendered absolutely useless should the
only evidence available be that of "eyewitness" testimony.
Appellant fails to recognize that the great weight
of majority opinion, both in this State's jurisdiction as
well as most other states, accepts and readily admits eyewitness testimony - even from the most questionable
of sources (corroborating accomplices, children, drug addicts, etc.). See State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 377, 401
P. 2d 445 (1965) as to children, United States v. Kearney,
420 F. 2d 170 ( 1969) as to addicts.
The State legislature has recognized the importance
of eyewitness observation of factual events and has so
enacted their belief as to such reliability based upon Utah
Code Ann. § 78-24-1 (1953), which reads in part:
"Who may be a witness - Jury to judge
credibility. All persons without exception, otherwise than as specified in this chapter, who having
organs of sense, can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perceptions to others, may be
witnesses."
The courts have been very willing to accept most
testimonial evidence, even from children and drug addicts, based solely upon the absolute need to place facts
before the jury for them to sift through and analyze in
rendering their verdict. Even the most incompetent of
sources have aided the trier of facts in a search for the
truth - and an ultimate valid conviction.
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In a recent decision handed down by this Court, evidence given by a witness who had been partially insane
was deemed admissible. In so holding the court stated:
" ... that the competency of any given witness is a matter for determination by the trial
judge, and his determination in that matter should
be interfered with only when he has clearly abused
his discretion." State v. Scott, 22 Utah 2d 30, 447
P. 2d 908 (1968).
The competency and credibility of the State's witnesses were unimpeached by defense counsel at trial. No
evidence was introduced at trial which would allude to
poor perceptivity or impairment of either Mr. Rosenberg
or Miss Sorenson's sensory perception. Defense tried to
create some doubt as to Miss Sorenson's ability to see
defendant in the dark on the porch, yet her testimony
adequately refuted defense counsel's contention:
Q. Were there any lights around the porch
when you saw the defendant standing on the
porch there?

A. Yes. There is always - her light is always on from dawn 'til - you know, it is on practically all the time and it is a great big huge light
plus there is a light from - that depot shows
light too. You can see all the way out to the sidewalk" (R. 64) .
Scott also tries to attack Miss Sorenson's testimony
by trying to show that she had no reason for identifying
or taking special interest in the defendant, because she
did not know that a crime was being or was about to be
committed. However, the very fact that she followed
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him down the street, bumped into him on her friend's
porch at night, and the odd way that Scott asked her
about the address (2118 instead of 218) and mumbled
something about the "gas pumps" across the street would
clearly put any reasonable person in a state of apprehension as to such occurrences. Since appellant raises the
question of racial differences and the tendency to regard
other races as "all looking alike," likewise the differences
in race also create an air of fear or mustrust (being placed
on guard) whenever approached by a person of a different race, especially at night under such unusual circumstances.
Miss Sorenson had immediate further cause to remember the defendant when while walking down the
street with a friend that same night, she was stopped by
the police and asked whether or not she had seen anything suspicious going on at the scene of the robbery
(milk depot). Naturally her first thought would be to
remember seeing the defendant wandering around the
neighborhood mumbling things about the milk depot "gas
pumps," addresses, etc. She also independently identified
Scott from several police photos, and because of the short
duration of time between when she first saw Scott and
the police first questioned her, Scott's identity was still
very fresh in her memory. Indeed, it appears from Miss
Sorenson's testimony and the foundation upon which
such testimony was based that the judge and jury properly considered such testimony and found a reasonable
basis for its admission and belief.
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Rule 19 of the newly adopted Utah Rules of Evidence states:
"As a prerequisite for the testimony of a witness on a relevant or material matter, there must
be evidence that he has personal knowledge
thereof, or experience, training or education if
such be required. Such evidence may be by the
testimony of the witness himself. The judge may
reject. the testimony of a witness that he perceived a matter if he finds that no trier of fact
could reasonably believe that the witness did perceive the matter."
Adequate unimpeached testimony at trial clearly
supported Miss Sorenson's ability to perceive, recollect
and recall what transpired the night of the burglary:

1

"The practical exigencies of crime detection
and prosecution are to be reckoned with and allowance made for the fact that proof beyond all pre- ,
adventure of doubt could seldom be had, nor does
the law require it." State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d
110, 114, 307 P. 2d 212 (1957).

1

*

*

*

"Most crimes, and particularly burglary are
committed with whatever stealth and aiming the
perpetrator can devise to escape detection and
identification, and all that law enforcement offi- '
cers and those victimized can do is to make such
observations and piece together such evidence as
they are able to obtain, and if it warrants doing
so, present it to courts and juries, and the standard which must be met is only that proof of guilt
be established beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
at 114.
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A review of the victim, Mr. Rosenberg's testimony
unquestionably points to an adequate opportunity for
him to witness and identify Scott when the milk depot
was robbed. The robbery took place in the store, under
adequate lighting, and Mr. Rosenberg was no more than
ten feet from Scott when the gun was pointed at him.
Even though he may have been "a little nervous," this
is no reason for totally discounting Rosenberg's testimony.
Miss Sorenson noticed Scott's bad leg when he was
limping dovm the street in front of her. This fact, in and
of itself, would narrow the scope of negro male suspects
who could have committed the crime. Although Rosenberg did not see Scott limp into or out of his store, he
did notice that Scott, although left-handed, in trying to
pull the gun from his right pocket, had difficultry using
his right hand. On cross-examination Mr. Nemelka
brought out the fact that Scott had an injured right arm
on the night in which the robbery occurred:
Q. Mr. Scott, you did have an injury to your
arm then? On the night of this robbery you had
a bad right arm didn't you?

A.

No, it wasn't a bad right arm.

Q.

You did have the injury to it?

A.

I just had a bandaid over it.

Q.
to it?

A.
Q.

Didn't you say you had had an injury
Yeah, before this.
What was the injury?
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A. I had got cut.
Q. How deep was the cut?

A. I don't remember" (R. 23).
Apparent from the record, the evidence, when viewed
by its cumulative effect on accused's guilt, created many
doubts as to defendant's innocence to the crime for which
he was charged. The jury has the duty to consider all
the evidence submitted at trial. If they were to give undue weight to one witness's testimony at the expense of '
all other evidence reasonably presented, this too would
be prejudicial.
Scott would have this Court disregard the state witness's testimony while admitting his alibi testimony such testimony suffering from the same defects he criticizes the evidence presented by the state for doing. At
no time did appellant adequately establish absolute proof
that he was at the convalescent hospital at the time of
the crime.
The nurse who was supposed to have given Scott
some medication at about the time of the crime appeared
at trial to be uncertain as to the exact time which Scott
might have received treatment, if at all.
When Miss Frkovich was asked if there had not been
times when she had written down a certain time for giving medication when in fact medicine had been given as
late as forty-five minutes after it had been written down,
she answered, "there has, yes, sir" (R. 86).
Mr. McPhie, a witness for defense counsel, testified
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that rigid security measures were taken to insure that
the patients remained locked in the hospital after closing
time. In cross-examination of McPhie with regard to
the control of 'keys used to lock the doors, McPhie testified as follows:
A. No, we had a problem with a D. V. R. Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, with a
quadriplegic sneaking out with girl friends and
a little bit of a drinking problem. As a result, key
control has been a little better. (Emphasis ours.)
out?

Q.

So you have had both sneaking in and

A. We had a little problem at one time aiid.
as a result of that it is a little tighter control" (R.
108).
These loopholes in defendant's alibi point to the
danger of relying solely on one person's testimony at the
expense of all of the evidence presented at trial. The
evidence that Scott relies on for his alibi suffers
from the same defects that he accuses the State's
evidence of doing. The vigor with which the police attempted to identify and locate the suspect through use
of photos and police lineups was no more prejudicial to
the sustaining of defendant's guilt than defense counsel's
coaching of witnesses or their own inherent fears of failing to properly take care of patients and drug addicts
assigned to the hospital's care. Indeed, the hospital may
have been negligent in allowing the defendant to sneak
out of his room. Thus, there is an equally strong possi-
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bility that alibi evidence might have been fabricated to
"save face," so to speak.
It is not the state's contention that its evidence
was any better than that of the accused. Rather, the
State is of the belief that when all the evidence was
weighed as a whole by the jury, including the alibi testimony presented at trial, this evidence sufficiently convinced the jury. (as evidenced by their verdict), that Scott
was guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As stated in State
v. Sullivan, supra, at 110:

"In a criminal prosecution, the jury could consider the witnesses in the state's case but is was
not only their privilege but their duty and responsibility to survey the whole evidence, and in
doing so they could also properly consider the
strength and consistencies in the evidence of the
state and all reasonable inferences and intendments fairly and naturally arising therefrom, in
determining where they believe the ultimate truth
lay. (Emphasis ours.)

*

*

*

"The very essence of trial by jury is that the
jury are exclusive judges of the weight of the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and the facts to be
found therefrom." Id. at 114.
As this Court has stated, before a jury verdict will
be set aside on appeal, it must as a matter of law be based
on inconclusive evidence. State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d
110, 307 P. 2d 212 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U. S. 845.
Also, all presumptions favor the validity of a lower court
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judgment. State v. Seymour, 18 Utah 2d 153, 147 P. 2d
655 (1966).
Appellant asks in effect that this Court displace the
jury, and independently weigh the evidence. However,
it has been held in Utah that unless as a matter of law
the finder of fact made an erroneous decision, the Supreme Court will not weigh the evidence. State v. Hodges,
Utah 2d 187, 381 P. 2d 81 (1963):
"If the evidence favorable to the state, with
all reasonable inferences and intendments that can
be drawn therefrom, could sustain a verdict of
guilty the cause should be submitted to the jury."

State v. Peterson, 110 Utah 413, 417, 174 P. 2d 843
(1946). See also State v. Shonka, 3 Utah 2d 124, 126,
279 P. 2d 711 (1955), and cases cited therein.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Schad, 24 Utah
2d 255, 470 P. 2d 246 (1970) in ruling on the sufficiency
of evidence sin1ilarly held:
"As to whether or not the evidence was sufficient enough to justify the conviction, we survey
the evidence and any reasonable inferences that
fairly may be drawn therefrom in the light favorable to the jury's verdict. Unless upon our review
of the evidence and the reasonable inferences
fairly to be deduced therefrom, it appears that
there is no reasonable basis therein for such a
conclusion, we should not overturn the verdict."
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CONCLUSION

The State appreciates appellant's graphic illustrations presented in his brief as to optical illusions and
other strange phenomenon. Appellant fails, however, to •
show where he was in any way denied due process of law
in any respect of the phrase. It is for this reason that the
State is of the belief and thereby contends that the jury,
serving its proper role, having been properly instructed
rendered a verdict which is readily supported by the
evidence of the case. A review of all the evidence, and
not just ftagments thereof, lends adequate basis to and
support for that verdict. Therefore, the respondent
submits that the conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAURENN.BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

